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1 Introduction
Road transportation is responsible for a large share of local and global air
pollution, and it is associated with other problems such as congestion and
accidents. Policy makers all over the world have attempted to deal with this
issue. On the one hand, they have introduced nationwide measures like fuel
economy standards, emissions norms or gasoline taxes. On the other hand,
there are also many policies that address the externalities locally. Cities all
over the world, from emerging market metropolises to medieval European
towns, use driving restrictions to control road transport. Many European
towns have recently introduced Low Emission Zones to reduce the ambient
concentration of particulate matters (PM 10). Local public transport re-
ceives heavy subsidies in many regions, often motivated by environmental
considerations. Road pricing schemes are discussed in many countries, and
in some cases actually applied.
In the following, I will deal with such measures that are designed to allevi-
ate transportation externalities at a local level. Introducing such instruments
rather than working with national or even international policies can be jus-
tified when there are local pollution hot spots. In principle, the transmission
mechanisms by which local policy instruments influence welfare are analogous
to those of policy instruments that are implemented at a national level:
1. The policy instruments influence transportation patterns (level of trans-
portation, modal split, composition of vehicles, traffic flows).
2. The changes in transportation patterns affect emissions.
3. The emissions influence ambient pollution levels.
4. Pollution adversely affects human health or more generally the quality
of the services provided by the environment.
5. These quality changes correspond to welfare effects.
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In a narrow sense, economic analysis only deals with the first and last
issue: It investigates how policy affects behavior, and it evaluates the welfare
losses from pollution. The other issues are the domain of engineers, natural
scientists and medical scholars. However, the boundaries between the differ-
ent fields are becoming blurred. For instance, economic analysis can help to
uncover the effects of policy instruments on ambient pollution levels (Section
3.3) or on health (see Section 5.2).
This review will therefore ask: What are the effects of local transportation
policy instruments on pollution, health and welfare? I will mostly focus on
evidence rather than theory. I will pay specific attention to those effects that
are particularly relevant to local policy instruments. First, such instruments
may improve the environmental quality in one region at the cost of higher
pollution elsewhere. This concern is particularly obvious for bypass roads,
but it also arises for road pricing and for driving restrictions such as low
emission zones or pedestrian areas. The critical issue is the size of these
undesired side effects. Can they be so large that they make up for the gains in
environmental quality in the target area? Second, there could in principle also
be positive effects on other regions. For instance, attractive public transport
in a city can induce commuters from nearby regions to switch modes. Also,
even measures that are primarily designed to reduce local transportation can
contribute to reductions in global pollution: If such local measures lead to
an overall reduction in driving, they will, other things equal, reduce carbon
dioxide emissions even if this is not the prime intent of the measure.
The selection of papers included in this survey is, of course, to some
extent subjective. Apart from the thematic restriction to policies that target
small regions, several other points were important. First, I confined myself
mainly to studies that capture the quantitative effects of policies on the basis
of an ex-post assessment (rather than through ex-ante analysis, e.g., via
simulations). Second, I gave preferential treatment to studies that provide a
solid econometric assessment of the effects wherever available. I occasionally
added anecdotal evidence, references to case studies, government reports, etc.
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when I could not find any superior sources.
The obvious problem of the following treatment is that it only deals with
a very small fraction of the local transportation policies that have been in-
troduced all over the world, mainly because not many of these policies have
been investigated systematically. I will therefore put particular emphasis on
the extent to which the conclusions from the small set of cases considered can
be generalized, and I will highlight the limitations of such generalizability.
In Section 2, I introduce the framework for the analysis. Section 3 deals
with the effects of supporting local public transport. In Section 4, I review
some studies on driving restrictions. Section 5 reports on the limited experi-
ence with road pricing. Section 6 concludes.
2 The framework
In this section, I provide a formal framework that serves several purposes.
First and foremost, it helps to define the issue of this survey more precisely.
Second, it is useful to organize the literature. The issues treated below can
be addressed within the framework, in some cases after mild modifications.
Third, the framework allows us to identify through which channels the policy
instruments under consideration might affect the allocation and, in partic-
ular, the emissions. Finally, the framework is useful for finding potential
sources of inefficiency.
Because the framework is supposed to be applicable to a wide variety of
related policy instruments, it seems most appropriate to take a reduced-form
approach rather than to introduce a fully specified model that is explicitly
based onmaximization behavior. At least for the purpose of defining the issue
and organizing the literature nothing is lost by this approach. Nevertheless,
in the appendix I sketch one of the many conceivable models that can be used
to provide a microfoundation for the reduced-form approach of this section.
It helps to sharpen the understanding of the policy transmission channels,
and of the sources of inefficiency.
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There are two regions,  = 1 2. In region 1, a local transportation policy 
is introduced. We treat  as a parameter that affects transportation patterns
and thereby emissions in an equilibrium model that we do not specify here.
Also, for ease of exposition, I treat  as a real variable in the following; but
the framework can easily be adjusted to incorporate discrete instruments.
The policy is designed to make car transportation in region 1 relatively less
attractive than public transportation and/or reduce the environmental harm
resulting from transportation. Region 2 summarizes neighboring areas in
which no policy is introduced, but which may be indirectly affected by the
policy.
For most of the discussion in the following, we distinguish only between
two types of transportation, car transportation and public transportation.1
We denote the amount of car transportation in region , measured in pas-
senger kilometers, as  (). We capture the emissions from cars in region 
as  ().2 We introduce the notation  () =  () () for the specific
emissions from car transportation. We suppose that there is an alternative
mode of transportation (“public transport”), and we denote the level of pub-
lic transport in region , measured in passenger kilometers, as  (), the
emissions as  () and the specific emissions as  () =  () (). Fi-
nally, we suppose that there are other economic activities (consumption and
production) in each region, which are summarized in a vector (). We
denote the emissions from these activities as  (). Most of the empirical
literature treated below does not explicitly treat possible effects of the poli-
cies on these other activities, that is, implicitly treats these other activities
 as independent of . This is obviously a simplification: For instance, a
policy that makes local road transportation more expensive is likely to have
substitution and income effects that influence the consumption of other goods
(and thereby emissions); it will also tend to increase the costs of supplying
other goods locally. As another example, if local public transportation is fi-
1Refining the approach by allowing further modes is straightforward.
2The formulation incorporates the case of heterogeneous emissions if  () is regarded
as a vector.
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nanced locally by taxes, it may crowd out other consumption and production
activities, which again will influence emissions.
In this simple setting, total emissions in region  are
() =  () () +  () () + ().
Thus, the total effect of a marginal policy change on emissions in region
 is

 =

 
 +

 
 +

 
 +

 
 +

 . (1)
Policy potentially affects emissions via five channels: The first term cap-
tures effects that result from changes in the amount of car transportation;
the second term the effects on the specific emissions of car transportation.
The third and fourth term are the corresponding expressions for public trans-
portation. The last term, which I shall mostly ignore in the following, sum-
marizes all the effects on non-transportation emissions.
The policy measures we consider are all supposed to reduce emissions
by reducing the amount of car transportation in region  = 1 (1  0)
and/or the specific emissions of car transportation (

1  0). Reductions in
the amount of car transportation will often go hand in hand with increases
in public transportation (

1  0), either because the policy consists of
a direct support of public transportation or because it makes driving cars
less attractive and cars substitute towards public transportation. Either
way, potential increases in public transportation may well lead to increases
in pollution that counteract the targeted emissions reduction; this effect is
captured by the term 

1 1 . In principle, the policy could also affect the
specific emissions of public transportation, for instance, because increased
patronage increases the load factor. This effect is captured in the term 1 1 .
Equation (1) is useful for identifying some of the questions we shall
deal with in the following. Very generally, the studies we consider aim at
measuring the marginal effect  of particular policies on the emissions
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in regions  = 1 2. Often they focus on the immediate effect on emis-
sions from car transportation, asking in particular what the combined effect
 =
  + 
  on road transportation emissions is and, in particu-
lar, whether it is negative as desired. Even if 
  0, these reductions in
emissions could in principle be compensated by emissions from other modes
of transportation. Therefore, it is also important to understand the relative
size of 
 and
¯¯¯ ¯¯¯.
Several papers deal not only with the intended policy effects on region
1, but also with potential adverse effects on region 2. For instance, even if
a policy reduces car transportation in the particular region, and therefore
satisfies 

1  0 as intended, it is possible that this effect comes at the cost
of substitution of trips into other regions that are not targeted by the policy,
resulting in higher emissions in these regions (

2  0). The possibility of
such effects will be discussed, for instance, in the context of road pricing and
low emission zones.
Though I will focus on the effects of the policy measures on emissions,
some of the studies under consideration also deal with welfare effects more
generally. We capture the adverse effects of emissions on welfare in a dam-
age function  (1 2), which is increasing in both arguments. As a crude
simplification, we summarize the remaining welfare effects in an aggregate
function  ¡1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2 ¢; though some of the studies dis-
cussed below go beyond this simple form.3 First, the function captures effects
on consumer surplus. All types of transportation increase consumer surplus.
In principle consumer surplus can also be influenced by specific emissions
from transportation (for instance, if low specific emissions are brought about
by high load factors). Second, producer surplus can depend on all variables.
The net welfare is thus given as
 ¡1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2 ¢− (1 2) . (2)
3We thus abstract from policy effects on the surplus resulting from non-transportation
activities.
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The total effect of policy on net welfare is thus

 =
X
=12
µ 


 +



 +



 +



 −




¶
,
(3)
where  is given by (1). The first term reflects the surplus effects of car
transportation. The second term captures the effects of changes in the specific
emissions of cars on the surplus; the third term is the corresponding term
for public transport. The fourth term consists of the effects of increased
public transportation. The last term contains the damages from increased
emissions.
Assuming that the standard regularity conditions hold, an allocation¡1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2 ¢ is optimal if it satisfies the system of first-
order conditions. Without writing these conditions down explicitly, it is
intuitive to see why they might be violated:
1. Emissions might be too low or too high;
2. the distribution of emissions across regions may be inappropriate;
3. emission reductions in each region might be achieved by an inappro-
priate mix of transportation reductions and reductions of specific emis-
sions;
4. the mix of transportation (cars vs. public transportation) might be
inappropriate;
5. the allocation might focus excessively on reducing the specific emissions
from cars (relative to public transport) or vice versa.
In view of the simplicity of the framework, it is clear that it does not
capture all sources of inefficiency that policy needs to be concerned with. To
name only one example, if consumer heterogeneity was taken into account,
the allocation could put excessive weight on pollution reductions of subjects
for whom such reductions are particularly costly.
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3 Public transport subsidies
It is often assumed that the adverse effects of buses and railways on the
environment are small compared to those of automobiles. Therefore most
industrialized countries provide financial support for local public transporta-
tion, resulting in higher service quality or lower fares. Section 3.1 uses the
general framework introduced in Section 2 to identify the sources determin-
ing whether support for public transport has beneficial environmental effects
and to obtain a first rough idea of the likely size of such effects. Using (1),
this depends on the answers to the following questions:
1. How much additional ridership do the measures generate, that is, how
large is 

1 ?
2. To which extent does the increase in ridership reflect a reduction of car
transportation, that is, what is the ratio
¯¯¯1 ¯¯¯. 1 ?
3. How do the specific emissions of public transport (1 ) and cars (1 )
compare?
4. How does the policy affect specific emissions; that is, what is the size
of 

1 and
1 ?
4
Of course, a full welfare analysis would have to take additional effects
into account (see equation (3)); but, except in Section 3.4, our focus will be
on the environmental effects.
Some studies answer only one of the above questions at a time; others
implicitly address several or even all of them simultaneously. In Section
3.2, I will deal only with the effects of policies on transportation patterns
(Questions 1 and 2) rather than the induced environmental effects. I will
report on case study evidence and on attempts to come up with elasticities of
4The last question might appear irrelevant, as support for public transport does not
directly target specific emissions. However, by influencing load factors, the policy may
well affect emissions per passenger kilometer.
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public transport ridership and road transportation with respect to fares and
the quality of service. Section 3.3 discusses papers that directly estimate the
effects of transportation policies on pollution, thus addressing the first three
questions together. Finally, Section 3.4 goes beyond the analysis of the pure
emissions effects, by taking more general welfare effects into consideration.
3.1 The potential for emissions reduction
Before presenting results from empirical studies, I will use the general frame-
work to obtain some rough quantitative ideas about the potential of public
transport policies to reduce emissions (1 ) and about the determinants of
the size of the effect.
3.1.1 The framework
I will drop regional indices for simplicity. The transportation levels before
the introduction of a policy are 0 and 0 . The changes induced by the
policies are ∆ and ∆ , respectively.
Consider a policy (fare reduction, service improvement) which induces a
growth of railway transportation by a fraction
 ≡
∆
∆
0 . (4)
Existing studies estimate such growth rates.5 Define
 ≡ ∆

∆ (5)
as the share of the increase in public transport that comes from a re-
duction in car transportation.6 Capture the relative importance of cars and
5These studies suggest that service elasticities should be around 0.5 for buses and
somewhat higher for railways, whereas fare elasticities are around -0.3 (see Section 3.2.2).
6The results in Section 3.2.2 suggest a value around 0.6 for railways, but somewhat
lower and more variable values for buses.
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public transport by
 ≡ 

0
0 . (6)
As a drastic simplification, suppose not only  , but also  and  are
constant. To capture the relative importance of transport emissions, let
 ≡   (7)
The percentage growth rate of total emissions can easily be calculated as
 = 100
⎛
⎝

³
1 + −
´
 +  ¡1 + ¢+ +
 +  + +
− 1
⎞
⎠ . (8)
The following illustrations help to understand how the parameter values
influence the potential for emissions reduction. First normalize  = 1.
Let  = 05 and  = 9; that is, 50% of the increase in public transport
comes from reductions in car transportation, and cars are responsible for
90% of local transportation. Consider the effects of a 10% growth in public
transportation.
Figure 1 gives the percentage change of total emissions as a function of the
importance of transportation emissions () under different assumptions on
the specific emissions  . When there are no emissions from public transport
( =  = 0), the maximal reduction of total emissions (when emissions
come exclusively from transportation) is slightly above 055%: Because rail-
ways only account for a small share of total transportation, total emissions
are hardly affected even by a substantial increase in public transport. If
railways themselves pollute, then the potential reduction is smaller; and it
will be exactly zero for all  when  =  = 05, that is, public transport
pollutes half as much as cars per passenger kilometer. This reflects the as-
sumption that only 50% of the increase in rail travel come from reductions in
car transportation: When only a part of the increase in public transportation
comes from reduced car ridership, lower specific emissions of railways do not
suffice to guarantee positive environmental effects of public transport.
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Figure 1: Emissions Reduction Potential from Public Transport (Role of
Share of Transportation Emissions)
Figure 2 gives the percentage reduction of total emissions as a function of
the relative importance of car transportation () under different assumptions
on the specific emissions from rail transportation.7 The potential emissions
reduction is decreasing in . Suppose railways do not contribute to pollution
at all (0 = 1 = 0). In the relatively optimistic case that public transport
is initially responsible for one third of total transportation ( = 2) a fur-
ther increase of rail transportation by 10% would reduce total emissions by
125%.8 For more common values ( ≥ 5), the change would be 05% or less.
70 = 1 are taken to be 0, 025, 05 as before. The remaining parameters are fixed
as before, except that the share of the initial emission share of the transportation sector
is now fixed at 50% so that  = 1.
8For instance, the value  = 2 corresponds to the situation in the canton of Zurich
in 2005, which has an unusually dense public transport network. The shares are 60% for
cars, 29% for public transport; the rest is bicycle and pedestrian traffic:
http://www.statistik.zh.ch/themenportal/themen/aktuell_detail.php?id=4638&tb=1&mt=7;
April 2, 2010.
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Figure 2: Emissions Reduction Potential from Public Transport (Role of
Importance of Public Transport)
3.1.2 Summary and Discussion
This section identifies determinants of the potential for reducing emissions by
supporting public transport, such as the initial modal split, the overall share
of transportation, and the degree of substitution and the relative specific
emissions. It also suggests that under realistic assumptions, the effect of
supporting puiblic transportation might not be very large.
I will now review empirical evidence on some of the variables identified
here.
3.2 Effects on Ridership
A necessary condition for the mechanism just sketched to be effective is that
the policy measures under consideration are successful in increasing public
transport in the target region, that is, that 1 is sufficiently large. The
existing evidence on this topic is mainly anecdotal, with only crude attempts
for quantification and causal inference.
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3.2.1 Cases
Several papers provide accounts of unusual growth of public transport in spe-
cific cities which they attribute to policy measures. For instance, Fitzroy and
Smith (1998) deal with the development of public transportation in the Ger-
man city of Freiburg. Between 1983 and 1995, the number of public transport
trips rose from 27.7 to 65.9 million trips per year, after a long period of stag-
nation. This development was reflected in an unusual increase in the share of
public transport rose from 11% in 1982 to 18% in 1992. Understanding the
determinants of this evolution is difficult, because public transport was sup-
ported in several different ways. The supply of buses and trams increased.
A large-scale park-and-ride system was introduced. The fare system was
changed, with a particular emphasis on “Environmental Cards”, cheap sea-
son tickets for the entire network. In addition, various traffic restraints were
introduced, such as pedestrian zones, low speed zones and parking charges.
The authors provide a brief econometric analysis that accounts for some of
these factors. However, they do not address all of them and, in particular,
they do not consider possible interactions. Nevertheless, some tentative con-
clusions emerge from the analysis and the descriptive evidence. The authors
argue that the cheap season tickets had an important effect on demand for
public transportation. The introduction in 1984 accounted for an increase in
ridership by 9% and the extension of the range in validity in 1991 was re-
sponsible for another 13%. By comparison, the effect of the expanded tram
system was small, with a service elasticity of 0.24.9
9In a similar vein, Pucher and Kurth (1995) collect descriptive evidence from five
local public transportation systems in Germany (Hamburg, Munich and the Rhein-Ruhr
region), Switzerland (Zurich) and Austria (Vienna). In all these cities, an integrated
transportation authority (Verkehrsverbund) was founded at some stage between 1967 and
1990, and transportation grew, in spite of an overall negative trend.
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3.2.2 Elasticities
Many studies analyze the effects of fare reductions and service levels on public
transport ridership, so that it is impossible to do justice to the literature.
The following very brief account serves the sole purpose of obtaining a very
rough impression of the quantities involved.
Evans (2004) provides an account of half a century of evidence on the
elasticities
³∆1∆ ´ · ³ 1 ´ of public transport ridership with respect to cer-
tain policy variables . Though results for the United States dominate, the
paper also deals with cases from other countries, including Canada, the U.K.
and Norway. The underlying studies differ with respect to geographic and de-
mographic factors and the pre-existing service and fare levels, the time of the
measure and the adjustment time that was used to calculate the elasticities.
Nevertheless, some useful insights emerge.
For buses, the average service elasticity is approximately 0.5.10 Elastici-
ties above 1 are sometimes observed, but that is rare. As one might expect,
the elasticities are higher when initial service levels are low. For railways,
the elasticities are larger, with values between 0.5 and 0.9.11 Evans (2004)
also compiles results on the effects of fare changes on bus transportation. He
finds fare elasticities between -0.25 and -0.35 for San Diego and London.12
The motivation for public transport subsidies comes from the expected
reductions in car ridership. Quite generally, the response of public transport
to fares or service levels should be an upper bound for the absolute value of
the induced response of car ridership, because only some of the new public
transport users would otherwise use cars. Evans (2004) contains evidence
for such mode shifts from experiments in the Boston area carried out in the
10These elasticities give the percentage change in ridership induced by a 1% change in
the frequency of service.
11An outlier is provided by a study of London Transport (1993) which reports very
low service frequency elasticities of underground trains (0.08), which is below half the
corresponding value for buses.
12Again, the elasticity for the Underground system is considerably lower than for buses
in London.
15
nineteen sixties. He reports that 64% of the riders attracted by increasing
commuter rail frequency previously used their own car; 17% a carpool and
19% the bus. The figures for increases in bus ridership vary substantially,
between 18 and 67%. Pratt et al. (2000, 12-40ff.) report estimates between
60 and 80% for various U.S. cities.
3.2.3 Summary and Discussion
The studies summarized briefly in this subsection suggest that support for
public transport may at least have the qualitative effects on transportation
mentioned in Section 2, and they provide a rough idea of the relevant mag-
nitudes. Several important issues remain open, however. First, in view of
the heterogeneity of the observed elasticities, it would be desirable to im-
prove the understanding of the determinants of the size of the effect. Many
variables can potentially play a role, such as geographical characteristics of
the region, the degree of motorization, income level and distribution, etc. To
draw conclusions that are applicable beyond the regions under consideration,
such factors must be taken into consideration. Second, the effects of policies
on the environment have to be investigated more carefully. We now address
this issue.
3.3 The Effects on Pollution
The above results provide incomplete evidence for the idea that supporting
public transport may have beneficial environmental effects: Increased service
frequency and fare reductions lead to higher ridership (

1  0) for these
policies) and thereby to a reduction in road transportation (

1  0). As-
suming that public transportation leads to sufficiently smaller externalities
per passenger mile (1  1 ) and that
¯¯¯1 ¯¯¯ is sufficiently large relative to
1 , this substitution effect should then lead to lower pollution (1  0).
Justifying these assumptions is of course the missing link in the argument.
An obvious way to proceed would be to come up with specific emissions of
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the different transportation modes (1 and 1 ) and to combine them with
the previous estimates of the effects of policy on transportation behavior.13
Specific emissions obviously depend on many details. As an alternative to
this approach, I will therefore present two recent studies that directly esti-
mate the impact of improved local public transportation on pollution. These
studies are useful not only because of the results presented for the specific
cases, but also because they point to two approaches to obtaining clean esti-
mations of environmental policy effects, namely exploiting either large-scale
policy changes or inter-regional policy variation, that are applicable more
generally.
3.3.1 A new metropolitan transportation system
Chen and Whalley (2010) provide a sophisticated empirical analysis of the
effects of improved public transportation on local pollution, using evidence
from Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. The analysis is interesting for several
reasons. First, it provides a clean approach to analyzing the effects of public
transportation on local air pollution that is potentially applicable elsewhere.
Second, by focusing on a city in a rapidly growing emerging economy, it
deals with a case where the scope for environmental quality improvements
from public transportation is potentially large, because air pollution in the
counterfactual scenario would increase rapidly and there is substantial growth
potential for public transportation.
Identifying the effects of a new public transportation system on pollution
is not a simple task. For instance, the simple-minded approach of regressing
daily pollution levels on daily public transport ridership would most likely
fail because of endogeneity problems: If exogenous circumstances drive up the
demand for all types of transportation on certain days, one might well ob-
serve a positive correlation between high usage of public transportation and
high pollution levels (because of increasing road transportation), without
13A recent example for the calculation of such specific emissions for cars and railways is
IFEU (2010). Infras (2010) provides more detailed values for road transportation.
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there being any positive causal relationship between the two. To avoid such
problems, the authors exploit a large exogenous variation in public trans-
port ridership to identify its effect on carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and
ozone. In 1996, a new Mass Transportation System was introduced in Taipei,
which made public transport much more attractive than before. One would
therefore expect a discrete jump in ridership, and this indeed occurred.14 To
some extent, this increase should reflect lower car ridership. For pollutants
such that trains have substantially lower emissions per passenger, therefore,
emissions and ambient concentrations should fall.
To identify the effects of the discrete increase in the quality of public trans-
portation, Chen and Whalley (2010) apply a regression discontinuity analy-
sis, which isolates the discrete change from the time trend. They show that
the new transportation system led to a significant drop in carbon monoxide
emissions (by 9-14%). For nitrogen oxide, the effects were similar, but only
weakly significant. Unsurprisingly, there were no clear-cut effects on ground-
level ozone, which reflects the complexities of the chemistry of ozone.15 The
authors also provide some results that lend credibility to their identifying
assumption that, without the new transit system, air quality would not have
changed discretely: They show that no similar improvements in air quality
took place in other Taiwanese cities around the opening date, and they also
showed that, in Taipei itself, the concentration of pollutants unrelated to
transportation did not change in a discrete fashion either.
Using their causal analysis, the authors calculate the welfare gains from
reductions in infant mortality as 260 Million US Dollars. They use this to
argue that the figures applied elsewhere16 to value public transport subsidies
understate their positive effect, at least when applied to developing country
metropolises.
14From the very beginning, about 3 Million riders per month used the system.
15Though nitrous oxides are among the precursor substances of ozone, reductions in
 emissions do not necessarily reduce ozone concentrations; the effect depends on the
ratio between  and volatile organic compounds.
16See, e.g., Parry and Small 2009 (discussed in Section 3.4 below).
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3.3.2 Large Scale Support for Regional Public Transport
In the context of the railway reform of 1994, Germany set up a large-scale
program to support local railway services. Apart from introducing the pos-
sibility of competitive tendering, the federal government has since then sup-
plied around 5-6 billion Euros per year to the state governments to subsidize
regional passenger transportation. These subsidies have led to substantial
increases in the frequency of service. Again, theses measures are expected to
increase ridership (

1  0) at the expense of car transportation (

1  0),
leading to an overall reduction in emissions (1  0). As the discussion in
Section 3.1 has shown, this conclusion cannot be taken for granted.
Therefore, Lalive et al. (Work in Progress) match a detailed data set of
550 railway lines with a set of local pollution data to identify the environ-
mental effects of public transportation subsidies. They use the fact that the
regional variation in the expansion of public transportation has been con-
siderable. The authors exploit this fact to identify the effects of improved
public transport on local environmental quality and also on road accidents.
They hypothesize that improved railway services should reduce automobile
traffic and thereby lead to fewer road accidents and to lower overall pollu-
tion for carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate matters. For these
pollutants the specific emissions from road transportation are considerably
higher than for rail, and transportation has a high share of overall emissions.
However, there should be no effect for ozone (for which there is no clear posi-
tive relation between automobile emissions and concentration) and for sulfur
dioxide, which is not strongly related to transportation at all. Preliminary
results that use a suitable instrument to address the potential endogeneity
of transportation improvements suggest that improved railway services in-
deed have the predicted effects.17 The results also suggest that, by reducing
17Building from the results of Lalive and Schmutzler (2008), they use the mode of
procurement as an instrument (see Section 3.4) . They show that the frequency of railway
services grows more strongly on competitively procured lines, but otherwise there seems
to be little difference between competitive and non-competitive lines, except for variables
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automobile pollution, improved railway services lead to lower infant mortal-
ity. This is consistent with the results by Currie and Reed (2009) who show
that reducing emissions by improving traffic flows can have positive effects
on infant health (see Section 5.2).
In view of the sceptical remarks in Section 3.1, it may appear surprising
that the effects of public transport policies on environmental quality appear
to be quite substantial in Germany. To a large extent, the discrepancy can
be explained by the sheer size of the increase in public transportation: The
frequency of service on many German passenger railways grew substantially
since the middle of the nineteen nineties.18 To my knowledge the effects
of these changes on ridership have never been investigated analytically, but
at least Allianz pro Schiene (2010) complies a list of 16 successful cases
of seemingly moribund railway lines, most of which achieved increases in
ridership by several multiples within a decade or less. In all of these cases,
there were substantial increases in the frequency of services, but usually by
a much smaller percentage than the resulting increase in ridership.
3.3.3 Summary and Discussion
The studies in this subsection identified clear effects of improved local trans-
portation on several pollutants. Of course, these results were generated for
specific examples, and there is no guarantee that they hold elsewhere. How-
ever, at least the design of the study by Lalive et al. indicates how more gen-
eral insights might be achieved. Even though the authors focus on Germany,
the data points concern hundreds of different regions with different charac-
teristics. Potentially, therefore, this information can be used to identify the
circumstances fostering beneficial environmental effects of public transporta-
tion, at least within the sample. Even though the external validity of the
results cannot be taken for granted, they would at least provide a first step
for informing policy outside of Germany.
that can be controlled for.
18Lalive and Schmutzler report a growth of approximately 28%.
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3.4 Welfare Effects
Parry and Small (2009) introduce a general framework to empirically evaluate
the welfare effects of subsidies, and they apply to specific cases.
3.4.1 Framework and Applications
This framework can be used to predict whether marginal reductions of exist-
ing fares would lead to higher welfare. The total welfare effect consists of four
components, which are related to, but not identical with those identified in
equation (3). The main differences are that the authors distinguish between
different modes of public transportation, and that they allow for different
quality levels for each mode. We can easily refine the approach of Section 2
by distinguishing between the modes  1 (the mode that is being supported)
and  2 (the remaining modes), and by introducing different quality levels.
First, there is the marginal cost/price gap: Fare reductions increase rid-
ership for the particular mode, which increases both consumer surplus and
production costs; as the price is typically below marginal costs in the status
quo, this effect tends to be negative.19 Second, there is the net scale economy
effect, reflecting benefits for the customers from increases in service frequency
and route density as well as losses from increasing vehicle occupancy. Third,
there is an externality effect which consists of the increasing externalities for
the particular mode of public transport and decreasing externalities from au-
tomobiles.20 Finally, the other transit term captures the effect of reductions
in the ridership of other modes of public transport, namely reduced supply
costs, but also reduced externalities. Also, users of these other modes benefit
from reduced vehicle occupancy, but suffer from decreasing service frequency
and route density.21
19Adapting the language of Section 3.1,this effect can be written as 1
1 .
20In the (adjusted) terminology of Section 2, this corresponds to

³  + 1 1 ´.
21These effects can be captured as 2 and

³2
1
2
´
.
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To apply the approach in a particular example, a long list of questions has
to be answered: (i) To which extent does the agency respond to an increase in
demand by expanding capacity rather than increasing vehicle occupancy? (ii)
What are the average operating costs per vehicle mile and per passenger mile?
(iii) What are the passenger fares? (iv) What are the user costs (waiting,
crowding, access?) and the benefits and costs from scale economies? (v)
What are the externalities from pollution and congestion? (vi) What are the
relevant elasticities?
The authors apply their approach to the public transportation systems
of London, Washington and Los Angeles. With only one exception (peak-
period buses in Washington), they find positive welfare effects of increasing
the current subsidy. The size is around 0.2-0.6 cents per passenger mile one-
cent increase in the subsidy. The authors also compare their results to earlier
studies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these other studies arrive at widely varying
conclusions.22
3.4.2 Summary and discussion
Parry and Small (2009) provide a convincing framework for analyzing the
welfare effects of transportation subsidies, but there are at least two caveats.
First, it is not clear that the underlying welfare function should be quasi-
concave in fares. Thus, even if the approach allows to estimate the welfare
effects of marginal changes in fares (and thus subsidies), it does not necessar-
ily have much to say about the global optimum of the problem. On the one
hand, even when small subsidy increases lead to higher welfare because they
encourage higher ridership in an existing system, it might still be preferable
22Glaister and Lewis (1978) and Glaister (1984) came up with similar results for London.
Studies of Chicago (Savage 1997) and some Australian cities (Dodgson 1986) support the
case for lower fares. Winston and Shirley (1998) find low optimal subsidies, and, for the
Washington rail system, Winston and Maheshri (2007) calculate a net welfare loss of USD
195 million per year. In the last two studies, the different conclusions can be traced to
factors such as the different treatment of sunk capital costs and scale economies.
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to abolish the system altogether to save on the potentially large fixed costs.23
On the other hand, even when small subsidy increases do not have a positive
effect on net welfare, very high increases can, in principle, lead to so much
higher increases in ridership that they improve welfare compared with the
status quo. While some of the results on elasticities discussed in Section 3.2.2
suggest otherwise, the anecdotal evidence from Germany reported in Section
3.3.2 indicates that such effects may be important.
Second, providing estimates of the relevant quantities is obviously sub-
ject to many problems. For instance, the externalities should include carbon
dioxide as a global pollutant, diverse local pollutants, noise and congestion.
Estimating the costs of each type of pollution is subject to large method-
ological problems and value judgments. For the case of carbon dioxide, this
point has been belabored elsewhere, without any sign of a reliable consensus.
Even for the comparatively simple case of local pollutants, the task is non-
trivial. For instance, as the discussion in Section 5.2 will show, developing
reliable estimates of the causal effects of local pollutants from transportation
on health is a difficult task.
Contrary to other studies mentioned in this section, the paper by Parry
and Small (2009) not only deals with individual cases, but provides a frame-
work that is widely applicable to quantify the welfare effects of small policy
changes. To exploit the potential of the paper further, it would be desir-
able, however, to address more different cases in this unified framework, so
as to identify the circumstances fostering beneficial welfare effects. Parry
and Small themselves allude to a special aspect of this point: They remark
that the welfare effects will also depend on the organization of public trans-
port, which in many cases appears to be inefficient, for instance, because
competitive forces are rarely used. Lalive and Schmutzler (2008, 2010) pro-
vide some evidence in this direction. They exploit the fact that the German
railway reform allows competitive tendering of regional passenger transport,
23However, a large part of the fixed cost may be sunk at the time the fare reductions
are discussed.
23
but does not force local agencies to use this tool. They show that the fre-
quency of service has grown more strongly on railway lines where competitive
tendering was used, suggesting that the required subsidies on these lines are
lower, so that agencies can afford service expansion. This interpretation is
also supported by further analysis that uses subsidy data directly (Lalive and
Schmutzler, 2010). Subsidies are much lower on competitively procured lines
than on otherwise comparable lines that are served by the former monopo-
list, Deutsche Bahn. Assuming as in Section 2 that there is a positive cost of
public funds, competition therefore has desirable welfare effects by reducing
the rents of suppliers.
4 Driving restrictions
An alternative approach to dealing with road-transportation related external-
ities consists of driving restrictions. Such restrictions can take many forms.
Pedestrian zones or speed limits are obvious examples, but the studies we
refer to in the following deal with more creative policies. These studies are
useful, because they illustrate the potential pitfalls of the policy measures
under consideration.
First, some large cities, in particular in Latin America, limit the number
of weekdays on which any car is allowed to drive. This type of policy is
supposed to reduce car ridership altogether (

1  0) and thereby curb
pollution (1  0). We deal with the effects in Section 4.1. Second, we
consider the regulation of particulate matters in the EU, a policy that has
led to the creation of so-called low emission zones that allow entry only for
cars with suitable emissions properties (Section 4.2). This policy is supposed
to reduce emissions both by reducing car transportation and by changing the
composition of cars in the area in an environmentally benign way (

1  0).
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4.1 Weekday restrictions
Many large cities in Latin America attempt to reduce air pollution and con-
gestion by restricting the number of weekdays on which any given car is
allowed to drive in the city. For instance, in 1989 a scheme (Hoy no circula)
was introduced in Mexico city, according to which each car is not allowed to
drive on one particular day of the week between 5 a.m. and 10 p.m. There
are some obvious costs and benefits of such a system. On the one hand, it
is based on the number-plate of the car and is thus easy to monitor. On the
other hand, it is hardly the most efficient approach to pollution reduction, as
it potentially imposes high costs on drivers who need to travel on particular
weekdays. What is more surprising, however, is that behavioral adaptations
appear to have led to increases in the levels of various pollutants. This claim
has been substantiated by the empirical analysis of Eskeland and Feyzioglu
(1997), which has recently been refined by Davis (2008).
4.1.1 Effects on Transportation
Eskeland and Feyzioglu suggest mechanisms which might neutralize the ex-
pected reduction of pollution or even lead to an increase of pollution as a
response to the regulation. First, some drivers may buy additional cars to
avoid the day without a car. These additional cars might be cheaper and
more polluting, so that there might be an undesired side-effect 1  0. Sec-
ond, families that buy a second car to avoid regulation are likely to drive
more than with one car in the absence of regulation. Third, even households
who do not buy additional cars might substitute some of their trips towards
the night or the weekend. The two last effects suggest that it is not even
clear that 

1  0. Using data from 1987 to 1992, the authors estimate the
effect of the regulation by constructing a counterfactual argument. To do
so, they estimate gasoline demand based on pre-regulation data. The results
suggest that, without the regulation, demand would have been lower except
in the two first quarters after the regulation.
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4.1.2 Effects on Pollution
Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) do not analyze the changes in local pollutants
directly. Davis (2008) goes much further. He measures the effects of the reg-
ulation on five major local pollutants,24 using detailed data from monitoring
stations for the years 1986 to 1993. Of course, it would be desirable to use a
comparable non-regulated city to construct a counterfactual, but the author
argues quite credibly that Mexico city is so unique that it is hard to find a
suitable candidate. Instead, he provides a careful before-and-after analysis.
He keeps the time window relatively small so as to avoid confounding fac-
tors like the introduction of the strict U.S. emission standards in 1994. He
also attempts to identify jumps in behavior at the point of introduction of
the new law by using a regression discontinuity analysis similar to Chen and
Whalley (2010).
In the main specification, he estimates the effect of the regulation on
average hourly air pollution, using covariates such as the month of the year,
day of the week or hour of the day as well as weather variables. He finds no
negative effect of the program on average hourly emissions. On the weekends
pollution increases, which is consistent with the idea that drivers shift from
days with driving restrictions to non-regulated days. Nevertheless, not even
the peak-level weekday emissions are reduced, for which regulation is most
likely to have the expected negative effect on pollution. In fact, there is
a discontinuous increase in the maximum daily air pollution levels. Davis
(2008) also provides some evidence for the sources of change. Consistent
with Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) he finds no sign of a reduction in gasoline
consumption. Instead, he observes a decrease in public transport ridership
and an increase in vehicle registration and sales.
24He considers carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen oxides, nitogen dioxide and sulfur
dioxide.
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4.1.3 Summary and discussion
The analysis of Hoy no circula invites an obvious conclusion. This specific
type of driving restriction is not only potentially inefficient, it even seems
to be ineffective, because it leads to countervailing behavioral adaptions.
Nevertheless, the conclusion is merely that “Rationing can backfire”. Pre-
cisely because of “the unique geography,..., unique transportation system,
and unusually large population” (Davis 2008) of Mexico City, it is not en-
tirely obvious what the analysis implies for cities such as Bogota, Santiago
and Sao Paulo that have introduced similar programs. However, there are
clearly reasons to be skeptical: Such measures target the environmental goal
in an extremely indirect way. While monitoring costs can justify such an
approach in principle, it appears that the flaws of the system dominate, and
there is no obvious reason to believe it should perform better elsewhere.
4.2 Low Emission Zones
It is hard to think of any local pollutants that have recently received more
attention than particulate matters. These substances cause a variety of car-
diopulmonary illnesses, from acute respirotary diseases to lung cancer (EPA
2004). As a result, regulation of PM 10 and PM 2.5 has become increasingly
stringent in recent years.25 We focus here on the EU regulation of PM 10,
because this has led to the introduction of interesting policy measures with
potential undesirable spatial size effects.26 This regulation has gone through
several stages, but the main features are as follows:
1. The EU sets maximum ambient concentration levels.
2. Countries with communities that are not in compliance with the rules
are fined.
25PM 10 and PM 2.5 refer to classes of particular matter, with PM 10 (2.5) consisting
of all particulates with a diameter of 10 (2.5) micrometers or lower.
26The brief description of the institutional details is based on the more detailed treat-
ment of Wolff and Perry (forthcoming).
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3. The details of how communities are induced to achieve attainment sta-
tus are left to the national governments.
In Germany, for example, non-attainment areas have to develop “action
plans” to alleviate the problem. As transportation is the main culprit for
PM 10 pollution, these action plans typically target emissions of road ve-
hicles by measures such as expansion of public transport, improvements of
transportation flows and the utilization of ring roads. Of particular interest
is the widespread use of so-called low emission zones.27 Only vehicles that
have sufficiently low PM 10 emissions are allowed into these zones. The four
emission categories are testified by easily visible windshield stickers. Drivers
who do not comply are fined.
In principle, several responses of drivers are conceivable. Some of these re-
sponses should unambiguously lead to lower PM 10 emissions. For instance,
drivers might use public transport (

1  0), upgrade their cars through
retrofits or even drive new, less polluting cars (

1  0). Given the relatively
high costs of these measures, however, it is also conceivable that drivers sim-
ply avoid the critical zones by driving around them. Thus the net effect of
low emission zones on PM 10 pollution is unclear. Within the low emission
zones, pollution should decrease, but emissions in the vicinity may well in-
crease. Such motivated, Perry and Wolff (2009) have analyzed the effects of
German low emission zones in more detail.
They not only investigate the effect 1 for the targeted region; they also
consider spatial substitution, that is, the effect 2 . They consider a panel of
PM 10 levels in various German cities. They ask how the LEZs changed local
emissions. They find that, within the zones, PM 10 levels have decreased by
9%. Even in surrounding areas, the effect seems to go in the same direction,
suggesting that spatial substitution is not a problem.
The authors also investigate the sources of the emission reduction. The
closer drivers live to low emission zones, the more likely it is that they adopt
2741 of the 79 German cities that are violating PM 10 regulation, 34 have implemented
such zones, and many others are considering their introduction.
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cleaner technologies. To judge the long-term effects of the policy, it would be
interesting to understand the adoption behavior of drivers from surrounding
neighborhoods. It is quite conceivable that they adopt cleaner technology
only after an extended period of frustration with the driving restrictions or
even when they buy a new car. Also, a full analysis of the environmental
effects would also have to take adverse effects from the early scrapping of
fully functional vehicles into account.
4.2.1 Summary and Discussion
Even though the paper of Perry and Wolff (2009) does not provide a full
welfare analysis, it suggests that low emission zones can be effective at ad-
dressing specific pollution problems. Another potentially useful aspect of the
empirical design that it can potentially help to provide information on the
factors contributing to the success of such measures: Because many differ-
ent cities are included, it should be possible to identify the circumstances
fostering desirable emissions effects by including suitable controls.
5 Road Pricing
A famous article on “pricing in urban and suburban transport” starts with
the words. “I will begin with the proposition that in no other major area are
pricing practices so irrational, so out of date, and so conducive to waste as in
urban transportation”. This quote is almost half a century old, going back
to William Vickrey, Nobel Prize Winner in Economics in 1996. Since the
publication of Vickrey (1963), road pricing has received much attention in
the transportation literature. While the main focus has always been on the
reduction of the time costs resulting from congestion, possible environmental
benefits have long been noted as a potential positive by-product of road
pricing.
In spite of the extensive discussions of the topic that have by no means
been restricted to academia, actual applications of the idea are rare. While
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toll roads are quite common in many countries, their main purpose is usually
to finance infrastructure. The clearest examples of schemes that are delib-
erately designed to reduce congestion are the recently introduced London
Congestion Charge and the much older Singapore Area Licensing Scheme.
Recent highway tolls for trucks in several European countries are also moti-
vated by the joint goals of reducing congestion and pollution, but they are
typically not local measures.
In Section 5.1, I review some of the evidence on road pricing. Section
5.2 addresses a related topic: It considers the health effects of collecting tolls
electronically, so as to avoid congestion.
5.1 Experience with Road Pricing
In line with the overall focus of this survey on ex-post analysis, I will con-
centrate on the experience with road pricing in London and Singapore, and I
will discuss reasons for the apparent failure to adopt such schemes elsewhere.
Finally, I will provide a brief account of the impact of the Swiss charge for
trucks.
5.1.1 London
In 2003, the London Congestion Charge Scheme (LCCS) was introduced in
an area of 21km2 in the City. The charge was initially £5, but raised to £8 in
2005.28 Santos and Fraser (2006) analyze the early effects of the scheme and
simulate the expected effects of the “Western Extension” that was introduced
in 2007. They find that the original scheme has been quite effective. They
report a decline in the number of cars entering the area by 33% in the first
year of operation, as a result of which the average travel speed increased
from 14 to between 16 and 17 kilometers per hour. On the other hand, bus
ridership (on inward buses) increased by 37% between Autumn 2002 and
28There are exemption rules for specific vehicles.
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Autumn 2003, reflecting an increase in the number of buses by 27% and an
increase in passengers per bus of 8%.29
As one might expect, traffic in the vicinity of the area increased, that is
2  0. However, even on the Inner Ring Road, which lies immediately
outside the congestion charge area, transportation (vehicles per km) only
increased by 4% from 2002 to 2003, so that these countervailing effects appear
to be small.
While there is widespread agreement that the inital London congestion
charging scheme reduced road transportation by a substantial amount, the
environmental effects are more contentious. Unsurprisingly the combination
of reduced automobile transportation and improved traffic flows reduced car-
bon dioxide emissions (Beevers and Carslaw 2005, Leape 2006). As to the
effects on local pollutants, Beevers and Carslaw (2005) find reductions of to-
tal emissions of NO and PM10 by approximately 12% in the charging zone,
whereas the effects on the Inner Ring Road were small (a 1.5% increase for
PM 10 and a decrease of 1.4% for NO). They argue that speed increases
and reductions in vehicles are equally responsible for the large effects in the
charging zone.
Another detailed study of the scheme concludes that it “appears to have
modest benefit on air pollution levels and associated life expectancy” (Tonne
et al. 2008). The authors of the study simulate the annual average NO2 and
PM10 concentrations using an emission-dispersion model. Their calculations
suggest that the absolute and relative reductions in concentration within the
congestion charging zone were larger than outside the zone. Also, the effects
on NO2 concentration were larger than for particulate matters, reflecting the
greater share of road transportation of the former pollutants compared to
the latter. Finally, the authors translated the predicted pollution reductions
into life expectancy gains. They conclude that, per 100’000 population, a
total of 188 years of life would be saved within the congestion charge area
29The authors also report increases in the usage of taxis and bicycles and in pedestrian
traffic, whereas truck traffic decreased by 11%.
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and 18 years in the rest of Greater London, leading to an overall gain of 1888
years of life.
5.1.2 Singapore
Even though the London Congestion Charge has arguably received more at-
tention than any other road pricing scheme, it is not the first of its kind. In
1975, Singapore introduced the Area Licensing Scheme (ALS): Cars entering
the Central Business District in the morning rush hour were charged three
Singapore dollars per day. The performance in the early years was sum-
marized in a voluminous World Bank report (Watson and Holland 1978),
and several authors have dealt with the ALS more recently (e.g., Chin 1996,
Christainsen 2006).
The system was highly effective at reducing transport. After the in-
troduction, the number of cars driving into the restricted zone fell by over
45%, resulting in an increase of traffic speed by 22% (Chin 1996). By 1992,
transportation had doubled again, but after almost two decades this is not
surprising. In the meantime, in 1989, a similar system had been introduced
for the evening rush-hour. It led to a less drastic, but also substantial decline
of traffic (by about one third).
The environmental effects of the system appear to be less well understood.
Though some efforts were made to monitor the pollution levels around the
time of introduction, there appear to be no detailed econometric studies of
the effects, so that one has to resort to simple before-and-after comparisons
without control for confounding factors. Watson and Holland (1978) re-
port clear decreases in the amount of nitrogen oxides immediately after the
introduction of the area licensing scheme, but less clear effects for carbon
monoxide. Also, as one would expect, the effects are clearest for the morn-
ing peak. All told, although the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme has been
evaluated less carefully than the London Congestion Charge, what is known
suggests that the experience has been positive.
32
5.1.3 Failed Experiments
One issue that is striking about road pricing is the rather unusual ratio be-
tween academic discussions of the policy and actual implementations. While
www.google.scholar.com gives 13400 entries under “road pricing”,30 Santos
and Fraser (2006) list only three actual examples of road pricing, namely
London, Singapur and a much smaller scheme in Durham.31 It is therefore
hardly surprising that, among the many authors who have dealt with road
pricing, quite a few analyze the political economy question what determines
whether road pricing schemes are actually introduced and, if so, whether
they move beyond the trial stage. For instance, Ison and Rye (2005) con-
sider test runs in Hong Kong (1983-1985) and Cambridge, U.K. (1990-1993)
which did not lead to the successful implementation of road pricing schemes,
and they compare the circumstances with those of London. The authors
mention several reasons for the lack of enthusiasm in the former two cases.
They argue that the congestion problem was not perceived as sufficiently
severe in Hongkong and Cambridge, that there was no clear strategic goal of
the exercise and that the technology was too complex. Privacy concerns also
played a role.
Recent developments have not made it seem very likely that the future
of road pricing is bright. A particularly sobering event for the supporters of
road pricing was the announcement of London’s new mayor Boris Johnson
in November 2008 to scrap the newly implemented Western Extension of the
London congestion charge region. Even though this plan has not yet been
carried out, it is a bad sign for the future of road pricing. Developments in
other countries are not very encouraging for the proponents of road pricing
either. In Switzerland, for example, though the national government decided
in December 2007 to move into the direction of local road pricing experiments,
nothing of substance has happened since then. Moreover, the recent political
30The site was visited on August 14, 2010.
31They exclude toll roads where pricing is exclusively motivated by financial considera-
tions (e.g., the much discussed Norwegian toll roads).
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climate suggests that the public support for such measures is not particularly
strong. Nevertheless Switzerland is one of the few countries where road
charges have been used on a large scale to fight transportation externalities;
however, the focus was not on inner-city traffic, but on long-distance freight
transportation.32 Also, some of the impediments to the adoption of road
pricing may become less important in the future. For instance, technological
improvements are likely to reduce monitoring costs. Also, widespread use
of monitoring technologies in other contexts may make road pricing appear
comparatively less intrusive. Finally, increasing pressure from growing traffic
might make the counter-arguments against road pricing less compelling.
5.1.4 Freight Transportation Charges
Since January 1, 2001, trucks driving on Swiss roads have to pay a mileage-
based charge (Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, LSVA) that depends
on weight and on emissions.33 Clearly, the reasons for the introduction of this
measure differ from those for inner-city road pricing schemes, but at least in
the case of Switzerland, local pollution played an important role. The main
expected benefit from the scheme was the reduction of pollution on the main
transit routes in the Swiss Alps (

1  0), but adjustments in the vehicle
composition (

1  0) where also expected. While I am not aware of any
academic account of the impact of this large-scale policy measure, a detailed
policy report summarizes the effects (ARE 2008).
The policy has succeeded in reducing freight transport in Switzerland or
at least containing its growth. In the first two years after the introduction of
the LSVA, total heavy freight transportation (in truck kilometers) dropped
by 4.8% and 2.6%, respectively, and it was essentially constant in the three
following years. This change reflects both an increasing use of heavier and
32In the mean time, countries such as Germany, Austria and Slovakia have introduced
similar policies.
33At the same time, Switzerland agreed to open its roads for trucks with a maximum
weight of 34 tons rather than just 28 tons.
34
more efficient vehicles and a growth of railway transportation.
Moreover, the report suggests that the massive increase in the share of
low-emissions vehicles is at least partly the result of the LSVA.34 However,
in spite of the reduction in transportation and the change in the composition
of vehicles, the impact on pollution in the Alpine valleys has reportedly been
low. Even though emissions of PM 10 and nitrogen oxides have fallen by 20 %
and 14 %, respectively, the concentration of these substances has fallen more
slowly, and in some locations, it has essentially remained constant. Though
the report does not contain an explicit counterfactual, however, it appears
likely that “business as usual” would have led to a substantial increase of
emissions; at least in the last years before the introduction of the charge,
overall transportation was increasing at a rate of more than 3% per year.
As in the case of other transportation management measures that apply
only to fairly small regions, part of the transportation reduction induced
by the LSVA probably came at the cost of higher transportation elsewhere
(

2  0). It has often been argued that trans-alpine freight transportation
has moved to Austria instead of Switzerland. Indeed, the number of trailer
trucks on one of the main alternative transit routes, the Brenner motorway,
has increased dramatically (by more than 30% between 2001 and 2004). To
which extent this reflects substitution from Switzerland to Austria or just
the business-as-usual trend is hard to disentangle — at least transportation
on the Brenner had already grown by about 40% between 1994 and 1999.35
5.1.5 Summary and discussion
Both serious studies and anecdotal evidence show that road pricing can be
effective at reducing transportation (1  0) and, if appropriately designed,
at reducing specific emissions (

1  0). Spatial substitution (

2  0) is
an issue in principle, but seems to be of limited importance at least for the
34For instance, in the international transit transport, the share of trucks in the category
EURO 3 grew from 5% in 2001 to 72% in 2005.
35http://www.vcoe.at/start.asp?id=4382&b=92; visited on April 16, 2010.
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case of road pricing in London. In spite of these positive effects, the political
support for the measures does not appear solid enough to make a large-scale
introduction of road pricing likely in the not too distant future. In some
ways, this is a chicken-and-egg problem. Because the evidence for the effects
of road pricing is limited to a small number of cases, the arguments for road
pricing have to rely mostly on theoretical considerations and simulations.
This clearly limits their political appeal.
5.2 Electronic Toll Pricing
Sometimes pollution from transportation is reduced by measures that were
not primarily designed with this objective. A case in point is the introduc-
tion of electronic toll collection (E-ZPass) on highways in the United States.
Reducing congestion has the primary purpose of reducing driving time, but
it is often claimed to have positive effects on the environment. These effects
come from the improved traffic flows, which, in the framework of Section 2,
show up as reductions in specific emissions 1 .
In an interesting paper, Currie and Walker (2009) quantify these effects.
The authors start from the observation of engineering studies that electronic
toll collection led to 85% reductions in delays at toll plazas in New Jersey
(New Jersey Turnpike Authority). They investigate how this reduced con-
gestion affects the health of infants born to mothers in the vicinity. To this
end, they use a difference-in-difference estimation. They compare the change
in health of infants within 3 kilometers of a toll plaza before and after the
introduction of E-Z pass to the change of health of a control group of infants
that live further away, but still within 3 kilometers from a major highway.
The authors identify significant effects of electronic toll collection on in-
fant health. They show that the probability of premature birth was reduced
by 7.29% from the base level of 0.096, and the probability of low birth weight
was reduced by 8.43% from the base level of 0.083.
36
5.2.1 Summary and discussion
The study of Currie and Walker (2009) is not only interesting because it
demonstrates the positive health effects of introducing electronic toll collec-
tion, but more fundamentally, because it helps to establish that there is a
causal relation between traffic pollution and health ( ) at all. While many
studies have demonstrated a negative correlation between fetal health of ex-
posure to motor vehicle exhaust, it is not easy to establish a causal effect.
The characteristics of pregnant women living near busy highways are likely
to be connected to adverse birth outcomes. The careful design of the study
by Currie and Walker essentially rules out that the negative relation between
traffic exposure and birth outcomes can be explained in such a way. Over the
period of observation, the composition of pregnant mothers remains similar
both in the treatment and the control group. This lends plausibility to the
causal explanation of the observations. This insight is of considerable value
beyond the specific case.
The conclusion that improvements of traffic flows may be desirable from
an environmental perspective is also potentially of more general interest.
However, a full analysis would have to take into account that better traf-
fic flows might also induce further transportation, potentially reducing the
beneficial environmental effect.
6 Conclusions
This brief review has dealt with evidence on several local transportation poli-
cies. Specifically, I focused on public transportation subsidies, road pricing
and driving restrictions.
The evidence shows that subsidies for public transport can be effective
at reducing automobile transportation (

1  0). While this suggests that
public transport might help to reduce pollution, the literature that analyzes
the direct effects of support for public transport on pollution (1 ) is much
smaller. Nevertheless, it seems to transpire that public transport subsidies
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might help to reduce such pollutants as carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide.
There also seem to be positive health effects. Though the net welfare effects
are much more contentious, some authors conclude that they might be pos-
itive. For this to be the case, however, it is important that the institutions
for public transportation are designed optimally. Specifically, the scope for
achieving cost reductions by using competitive mechanisms still appears to
be large.
Some of the more common applications of driving restrictions, such as
pedestrian zones in many medieval European towns, have benefits that are
obvious to those that have frequently enjoyed them, but these applications
should not primarily be judged by their ability to reduce pollution. In this
paper, I have dealt with two specific measures that were designed with the
purpose of fighting emissions. In spite of important differences, the “days
without cars” in Latin America and the “Low Emission Zones” in Europe
have one thing in common: They share the potential for undesired side ef-
fects. In the former case, this potential seems to have led to the surprising
result that regulation is not only inefficient, but also ineffective (presumably
because 

1 ≈ 0 and 

1  0). In the latter case, the potential problem of
spatial substitution (2  0) does not materialize. Having said that, how-
ever, it remains open whether alternative policies might have done the job
more efficiently.
Road pricing also has a large potential for environmental improvements.
A large literature shows the existence of a negative (though not very large)
elasticity of automobile transportation with respect to own costs. The limited
actual experiences with road pricing, in particular, those of Singapore and
London, and the attempts to introduce charges for trucks, in particular, in
Switzerland, provide further support for the idea that road pricing, properly
designed, can affect the overall level of transportation and the modal split,
and that it can have desirable effects on local pollution. The problem of
spatial diversion exists, but seems larger for long-distance freight transporta-
tion with well-defined alternative routes than for local road pricing with less
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substitution opportunities. Perhaps the most important concern with road
pricing is the limited acceptance of this instrument, which appears to slow
down its introduction.
Even though existing literature has provided many interesting results, it
seems that there still is a large potential for further research. Most impor-
tantly, it is important to corroborate the results by analyzing the robustness
and understanding the determinants of the size of the policy effects more
systematically. Most of the studies summarized here deal with specific cases,
and it is not always clear what drives the specific results. At least some of the
studies, however, could be extended to improve the generalizability of the in-
sights. These studies work with data sets that exploit geographical variation,
thus potentially allowing to improve the determinants of the environmental
effects of policies more systematically.
In addition, it would seem useful to understand more about the inter-
actions between policy instruments. For instance, road pricing and local
transport subsidies are different approaches to dealing with local transport
externalities. Can we understand better under which circumstances which
instrument is preferable? Or may there be circumstances where both instru-
ments should be used together? Moving beyond the small group of instru-
ments investigated here: How do the local policies investigated here interact
with national instruments such as emission norms? For instance, under which
circumstances are low emission zones preferable to more general rigid norms
for particulate matters or price-based solutions to the problem? The list of
topics is long, and it would be interesting to see more empirical research on
them.
Quite generally, it appears that the systematic empirical ex-post analysis
of actual local transportation policies is still in its infancy. In view of the
rich experience that has been made with at least some of these instruments,
it would seem important to tap this source of knowledge in order to guide
future policy.
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7 Appendix
There are several ways to give a microfoundation to the general framework
of Section 2. Even though it is also possible to provide a general equilibrium
foundation, the following sketch will focus exclusively on the demand effects
of the policy under consideration. This appears reasonable for the analysis
of local policy effects, for which the main part of the production adjustments
may well take part outside the regions under consideration.
Suppose there is a representative household who can consume goods 1 ,
2 , 1 , 2 , 1 and 2. The utility function (1  2  1  2  1 2;) is
assumed to be strictly quasiconcave, twice continuously differentiable and
monotone in
¡1  2  1  2  1 2¢.36 The dependence of the utility func-
tion on  will reflect specifics of the problem. For instance, when  corre-
sponds to an increase in the quality of public transportation in region 1, the
marginal rate of substitution 

1
1 should be increasing in  for any fixed
level of the other variables; for other policies (e.g., road pricing)  should be
independent of .
Suppose further that the household has an exogenously given budget 
and faces prices  () and  () ( = 1 2). For instance, if the policy
corresponds to road pricing in region  = 1, 1  0; similarly for fare
subsidies, 

1  0. Further, a policy might affect specific emissions 
and/or  , without necessarily affecting prices or marginal utility.
Finally, assume the household maximizes utility subject to the budget
constraint. The optimal consumption bundle is then determined in the usual
way, with a unique optimum given by the condition that marginal rates of
substitution between all goods equal the respective price ratios. For each ,
the allocation
¡1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1 2¢ then corresponds to the
household optimum
¡1  2  1  2  1 2¢ and the politically determined
vector (1  2  1  2 ) of specific emissions.
While counterexamples can easily be found, we shall assume that the
36We therefore abstract from direct utility effects of specific emissions.
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utility function is such that a policy that corresponds to a ceteris paribus
increase in 1 leads to a reduction in 1 and an increase in 1 . Thus, we
are assuming not only that the standard result of consumer theory holds that
the compensated own effect of a price increase is negative, we are demanding
in addition that car transportation is not a Giffen good. Moreover, we are
assuming that car transportation and public transportation within regions
are substitutes. Both properties can be guaranteed by choosing utility func-
tions accordingly. As the results reported in Section 3.2.2 show, they are also
confirmed empirically.
Moreover, we assume that a policy that leads to an increase in the mar-
ginal rate of substitution 

1
1 also leads to an increase in public trans-
portation (1 ) and a reduction in car transportation (1 ). This would be
immediately implied by strict quasiconcavity in the case of two goods; for
multiple goods; the result requires further restrictions on utility.37
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